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THE "CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME"
DEBATE: UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION AS A "BENEFIT
RECEIVED UNDER THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT"?
BRENT WILSON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In an exchange between Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin
and Professor Todd Zywicki during a hearing in front of the Senate
Judiciary Committee debating the 2005 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") known as the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), Professor
Zywicki stated, after being pressed by the Senator about the
quality of the reform, that "[tlhere is no word that I would change
in this particular piece of legislation."' Professor Zywicki was a
proponent of BAPCPA and perhaps being put on the spot by
Senator Feingold caused him to overextend the quality of the

* Juris Doctor, cum laude, The John Marshall Law School, Jan. 2011. I
would like to thank Professor Mary Jean Dolan for exposing me to her
brilliant example of legal writing that I will always strive to match. Also, I
would like to thank Professor Paul Lewis and Professor Jason Kilborn for
early inspiration on this topic, and Professor Allen Kamp for his Social
Security Act knowledge and assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Colleen
DeRosa for her mentorship, editing, and notes during the writing of this
Comment.
1. Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing on S. 109-1014 Before the Committee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate, 109th Cong., 42 (2005), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senatehearings&docid =f:42675.pdf. Professor Zywicki, a Visiting Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center, testified about the need for bankruptcy
reform and was asked questions from Senator Feingold regarding what
changes needed to be made to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) before it was enacted into law. Id.
In this exchange, Senator Feingold asked Professor Zywicki whether the
proposed amendments in BAPCPA required any amendments or were perfect
the way they were. Id. Professor Zywicki responded as stated above: that there
was nothing that he would change in BAPCPA. Id. Senator Feingold then
replied that he did not think that the professor was credible based on his
statement that not a word needed to be changed. Id. The Senator went on to
state that after all the economic changes over the past eight years, he was
surprised and concerned about how fast the BAPCPA bill was moving through
Congress. Id.
801
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BAPCPA reform. Professor Zywicki's support may have waivered
slightly since BAPCPA's inception in October 2005, but he is not
willing to give up on the amendments just yet. 2
However, if clarity was a goal, BAPCPA went astray almost
immediately in the definitions section. Specifically, the definition
of "current monthly income," as described in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A),
creates uncertain consequences in the courts and leaves the need
for at least a few words to be changed.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) the Code broadly defines
"current monthly income" drawing in every source of income the
debtor has available, "[t]he term 'current monthly income'-(A)
means the average monthly income from all sources that the
debtor receives . . . without regard to whether such income is

taxable income, derived during the 6-month period [before filing
the bankruptcy petition]

. . . ."3

However, after a broad definition

of "current monthly income" that taketh away, the Code starts to
giveth-in both compensation and confusion. In 11 U.S.C. §
101(10A)(B), "[current monthly income] includes any amount paid
by any entity other than the debtor .. . on a regular basis for the
household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents ...
but excludes benefits received under the Social Security Act . . . ."4
2. See, e.g., Circuit City Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail to Save
34,000 Jobs?: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,111th Cong.
(Mar. 11, 2009) (statement of Todd J. Zywicki, Professor, George Mason Univ.
Sch. of Law), availableat http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
Zywicki09031 1.pdf (discussing and refuting concerns about the BAPCPA
reform as it applies to Chapter 11, and if those changes caused more
businesses to liquidate instead of successfully traversing the strictures of a
Chapter 11 plan). The professor contends that it is "tempting to blame
BAPCPA" for these problems, but he claims that other factors, like restricted
access to debtor-in-possession financing, are more likely the cause for more
liquidations of companies who first try Chapter 11 restructuring. Id. at 19.
The Professor's loyalty to BAPCPA, however, shined through as he concluded
by stating "it is not so easy to point to BAPCPA as the scapegoat." Id.
3. The full text of this section states:
The term "current monthly income"-means the average monthly
income from all sources that the debtor receives (or in a joint case the
debtor and the debtor's spouse receive) without regard to whether such
income is taxable income, derived during the 6-month period ending
on- (i) the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the
date of the commencement of the case if the debtor files the schedule of
current income required by section 521(a)(1)(B)(ii); or (ii) the date on
which current income is determined by the court for purposes of this
title if the debtor does not file the schedule of current income required
by section 521(a)(1)(B)(ii); and .

...

11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A) (2006).
4. The full text of this section states:
(B) includes any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor (or in
a joint case the debtor and the debtor's spouse), on a regular basis for
the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents (and in
a joint case the debtor's spouse if not otherwise a dependent), but
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This section begs the question: what exactly does "benefits
received under the Social Security Act" mean? Does this phrase
mean that any funds received from the Social Security Act are
excluded? Or must a court determine what funds are "benefits"
under the Act and what funds are just indirectly related to the Act
and thus excluded from "current monthly income"? While
bankruptcy courts in many districts have not yet faced this issue,
the trend seems to be to include unemployment compensation in
the calculation.5
Unemployment compensation has a connection with the
Social Security Act.6 This connection is pertinent to any discussion
of BAPCPA's current effect on debtors due to the fact that the
unemployment rate is higher today than it has been for twenty-six
years, and it appears it will stay that way for the foreseeable
excludes benefits received under the Social Security Act, payments to
victims of war crimes or crimes against humanity on account of their
status as victims of such crimes, and payments to victims of
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18) or
domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18) on account of
their status as victims of such terrorism.
11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
5. See, e.g., In re Overby, No. 10-20602, 2010 WL 3834647, at *5 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. Sept. 24, 2010) (holding that unemployment compensation should be
included in "current monthly income" calculations); In re Winkles, No. 1030137, 2010 WL 2680895, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. July 6, 2010) (holding that
unemployment compensation is not a benefit received under the federal Social
Security Act but rather paid by the State of Illinois); In re Nance, No. 0905604, 2010 WL 2079653, at *2-3 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. May 21, 2010)
(incorporating by reference In re Kucharz and adopting the line of reasoning
that unemployment compensation is included in "current monthly income"
calculations); In re Rose, No. 09-70088, 2010 WL 2600591, *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
May 12, 2010) (gleaning Congress's "intent" from the Bankruptcy Code in
finding that "current monthly income" should include unemployment
compensation); In re Kucharz, 418 B.R. 635, 643 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2009)
(holding that unemployment compensation should be included in calculating a
debtor's "current monthly income"); DeHart v. Baden (In re Baden), 396 B.R.
617, 623 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that unemployment compensation
should be included in the "current monthly income" calculation of debtors); In
re Munger, 370 B.R. 21, 26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (holding unemployment
compensation is a "benefit received under the Social Security Act" and thus
excluded from the "current monthly income" calculation of debtors); In re
Sorrell, 359 B.R. 167, 183 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that
unemployment compensation is excluded from the "current monthly income"
calculation of debtors due to it being a "benefit received under the Social
Security Act").
6. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 501 (2006) (laying out what is required of the
states under the Social Security Act, so that they may receive federal funds for
unemployment compensation assistance). Specifically, Section 501 states: "The
amounts made available pursuant to section 1101(c)(1)(A) of this title for the
purpose of assisting the States in the administration of their unemployment
compensation laws shall be used as hereinafter provided." 42 U.S.C. § 501

(2006).
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future.7 Nonetheless, the question of whether unemployment
compensation should be considered a "benefit received under the
Social Security Act" per Section 101(10A)(B) remains unanswered.
Therefore, what is included in "current monthly income" of debtors
is undefined for most.
With unemployment higher than it has been in decades, and
as more and more unemployed debtors file for bankruptcy, the
issue of whether unemployment compensation should be
considered in calculating a debtor's "current monthly income" is
and will continue to be intensely contested.
Part II of this Comment will address the background of the
BAPCPA reforms and the consequences it has produced since
being enacted in 2005. Next, Part III will address the first five
cases to decide whether unemployment compensation is a "benefit
received under the Social Security Act," and the courts' reasoning,
as well as some commentators' positions on this issue. Finally,
Part IV and Part V will propose a plain meaning approach to
analyzing the Code and conclude that an attempt to go beyond this
approach to find Congress's "intent" in drafting Section
101(10A)(B) is futile and produces inconsistent judgments.

7. See Chris Isidore, Job Losses Ebb, but Unemployment Up,
CNNMONEY.COM,
Sept.
4,
2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/04/
newsleconomy/jobs augustlindex.htm?postversion=2009090408 (discussing the
rising unemployment rates throughout the country and signs of improvement
in the economy based on fewer job losses reported). The forecast by economists
for early 2010 was hopeful for a recovery to begin. Id. However, in reality the
unemployment numbers have not nosed over just yet. See e.g., Andy Soltis,
Unemployment Hits Highest Level Since '83, N.Y. POST, Mar. 7, 2009,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/politics/u
nemploymenthitshighest_1evel_8DM79syj2pq4y8Eic4IgDN
(stating that
"[t]he number of Americans without a job has hit 12.5 million-larger than the
population of Pennsylvania, and the highest since the government began
tracking the totals in 1940"); Jeannine Aversa and Christopher S. Rugaber,
Unemployment Rate Holds Steady at 10%, 85,000 Jobs Lost in December, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/08/
unemployment-rate-decembe n_416008.html (noting "[t]he number of
unemployed has hit 15.3 million, up from 7.7 million when the recession
started in at the end of 2007 ... [a]nd the number of people jobless for at least
six months hit a record of 6.1 million"). Economists think that the
unemployment rate will rise in the early months of 2010 and could reach
eleven percent, which would be the highest rate of unemployment since World
War II. Id. And into the years to come, "[m]ost economists think
unemployment will rise this year and stay high into 2012." Id.

The "CurrentMonthly Income" Debate

2011]

805

II. BACKGROUND

A. Congress'sDetermination that the Bankruptcy Code Was Being
Abused by Can-pay Debtors Leads to a New Approach: "IDon't
Mind Stealing Bread from the Mouths of Decadence"8
In 2005, Congress passed BAPCPA.9 This reform of the
Bankruptcy Code had the goal of finding the debtors that have the
ability to pay their creditors and making them pay, instead of
allowing these debtors to get the complete liquidation of their
assets and the fresh start that comes with the discharge of all
debts.10 Before BAPCPA, a bankruptcy court would have
discretion to dismiss a Chapter 7 filing based on the individualized
financial position of the debtor." The Code, at that time, required
a showing of "substantial abuse" for a judge to dismiss, but "there
was a presumption in favor of granting the relief sought by the
debtor."12
Now, BAPCPA calls for the debtor's "current monthly income"
to be calculated, and if it is above the median income for the
debtor's family size in the debtor's state, the debtor is subject to
further inquiries into his or her income and expenses.13 This
process is now referred to as the "means test."14
The questions now are: why did Congress believe that this
type of abuse was occurring, and who did Congress believe was the
primary offender? Many in Congress believed that bankruptcy
filings increased because debtors realized that they could avoid
their debts and obtain a quick discharge. However, the increase
was more likely caused by other factors (for example, lack of
health insurance with significant injury or illness, job loss, the
endless amount of credit card solicitations, etc.).15 BAPCPA and

8.

TEMPLE OF THE DOG, Hunger Strike, on TEMPLE OF THE DOG (A&M

Records 1991).

9. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
10. See ELIZABETH WARREN AND JAY WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS 150 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS] (discussing the presumption of abuse that Congress created in
BAPCPA to ensure that all debtors who have what Congress believes to be
enough money to pay their creditors are not allowed Chapter 7 relief but are
forced into Chapter 13).
11. Id. at 151.
12. In re King, No. 08-41975, 2009 WL 62252, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Jan.
6, 2009).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006).
14. See, e.g., In re Rudler, 576 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting BAPCPA
was created to reduce Chapter 7 filings by several measures, one of which was
the means test, which relaxed the standard of dismissing a case for "abuse" as
opposed to the previous requirement of a finding of "substantial abuse").
15. See Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing on S. 109-1014 Before the S. Comm.
available at
(2005),
10-12
Cong.
the Judiciary, 109th
on
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the means test clearly target the high earning, consumer debtor
who seeks the discharge of Chapter 7 in order to skirt the
obligations to repay his or her creditors.16 Having identified the
target, Congress further determined that the only type of debtor
that would engage in this sort of abuse is the debtor with
"primarily consumer debts."17 "Consumer debt" is defined by the
Code as "debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal,
family, or household purpose."18 It is therefore clear that Congress
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senatehearings&docid=f:42675.pdf (remarks of Professor Elizabeth Warren)
(pointing out that the means test treats all debtors alike in that the test
assumes that the debtors are in bankruptcy solely because the debtor
overspent). Professor Warren points out that the means test fails to take into
account that, generally, empirical data suggest that the people who are in
bankruptcy are forced there due to an unexpected life event or tragedy not the
indulgent lifestyle assumed by some individuals of Congress. Id. See also
Robert M. Lawless, et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?An Empirical Study of
Consumer Debts, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 350 (2008) (discussing empirical
research conducted that found that many people are still struggling with ever
increasing debt-likely even more individuals than before the BAPCPA
amendments-but the amount of bankruptcy filings after BAPCPA have
dramatically dropped).
16. "[BAPCPA] requires the bankruptcy trustee to examine the income and
expenses of high-income debtors and determine whether they have the ability
to pay something toward their debts." 151 CONG. REc. S1779 (daily ed. Feb.
28, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Specter).
17. Section 707(b)(1) states:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion
by the United States Trustee, trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, if
any), or any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual
debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarilyconsumer debts, or,
with the debtor's consent, convert such a case to a case under chapter 11
or 13 of this title, if it finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse
of the provisions of this chapter. In making a determination whether to
dismiss a case under this section, the court may not take into
consideration whether a debtor has made, or continues to make,
charitable contributions (that meet the definition of "charitable
contribution" under section 548(d)(3)) to any qualified religious or

charitable entity or organization (as that term is defined in section
548(d)(4)).
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2006). See also David W. Allard et al., Means TestCan it Work?, 061506 AM. BANKRUPTCY INST. 11 (June 15 - 18, 2006) (stating
that pre-BAPCPA determination of whether the debtor's debts were primarily
consumer was for the purposes of determining "substantial abuse" under the
old section 707(b), but now, BAPCPA makes this determination a "threshold
issue" in order to determine whether the debtor has to be subject to the means
test). This now creates the issue of how one determines what is "primarily"
consumer debt. Id. The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "primarily"
thus this is open to interpretation by the courts. Id. The possibility of a debtor
with many consumer creditors but with just one judgment creditor against his
business operations in an amount that dwarfs the consumer debts yields a
gray area. See THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, supra note 10, at 166-67
(proposing a similar hypothetical set of facts that is meant to draw the
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singled out the consumer debtor and did not create the means test
to prevent corporate abuse of the bankruptcy process.19
The results of BAPCPA in accomplishing what Congress
intended, as laid out above, have been less than perfect. 20 The
high-living, high-income debtor who incurs debt only to get it
discharged by abusing Chapter 7 seems to be a convenient
justification created or dreamed up by Congress to push forward
reform of the allegedly overloaded bankruptcy system. 21 If,
however, the goal was simply to reduce what Congress saw as too
many bankruptcy filings, then it worked marvelously. 22 As a result
of BAPCPA, more low-income debtors struggle longer and incur
more debt than before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code. 23 Thus, the bread stolen is not from the decadent but from

reader's attention to the issue of what exactly "primarily consumer debts"
means).
19. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006) (making no reference to
corporate or business debtors and thus excluding these type of debtors from
the rigors of the means test).
20. See generally Lawless, supra note 15, at 353 (reviewing empirical
research that indicates that the individuals who filed in 2007 have basically
the same income as those who filed in 2001, before BAPCPA, but noting that
the amount of filings in 2007 was reduced by 800,000). BAPCPA was designed
to make high-income debtors pay more of their debts, thus there should have
been a shift up in the incomes of the individuals who were filing after
BAPCPA. Id. "These income data suggest that instead of functioning like a
sieve, carefully sorting the high-income abusers from those in true need, the
amendment's means test functioned more like a barricade, blocking out
hundreds of thousands of struggling families indiscriminately, regardless of
their individual income circumstances." Id.
21. THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, supra note 10, at 144. "From
early 1980s to the early 2000s the number of bankruptcy filings had
quadrupled. By 2004, about one in every 75 households across the country
filed for bankruptcy. With more than 1.5 million cases filed (and more than 2
million people filing, counting husbands and wives who file jointly),
bankruptcy had become far more common than our forebears could have
imagined." Id.
22. See Lawless, supra note 15, at 350 (stating that after BAPCPA there
were 800,000 less families filing for bankruptcy). The authors refer to the
missing 800,000 as "squeezed from the system after BAPCPA." Id. at 378.
23. Id. at 349-50 (stating that throughout this decade families have been
under increasing amounts of financial stress because median family incomes
have declined, basic expenses for the family have increased, default on credit
cards and care loans is extremely high, foreclosures are up, and, generally,
Americans are "shouldering" unprecedented amounts of debt). Families that
filed for bankruptcy in 2007 compared to the families who filed in 2001 had
significantly more debt loads, but this trend began before BAPCPA and is in
line with that upward trend of debt. Id. at 375. BAPCPA foreclosed the options
of many of these families that were incurring more debt to seek bankruptcy
protection, and required them to tough it out without the safety net that
bankruptcy provides. Id. BAPCPA caused the bankruptcy filings to drop
dramatically but it did not lessen the amount of debt loads that the families
are now living with instead of filing for bankruptcy. Id.
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the dispossessed.
B. The Guarded Gates of the Chapter 7 Promised Land
The "heart of BAPCPA" is the means test of section 707(b).24
One court explained the intent behind this test by stating,
"Congress intended that there be a uniform and readily-applied
formula for determining when the bankruptcy court should
presume that a debtor's [C]hapter 7 petition is an abuse and for
determining an above-median debtor's disposable income in
[C]hapter 13."25
Since the 2005 enactment of the means test in BAPCPA, it
has had many detractors. 26 Even so, BAPCPA institutes the means
test as a hoop that consumer debtors must jump through in order
24. "The heart of [BAPCPA] is the means test." 151 CONG. REC. S1779
(daily ed. Feb. 28, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Specter). See also Sandra Manocchio,
Means Testing: The Heart of BAPCPA, 40 MD. B.J. 26, 30 (2007) (discussing
the "means test" and the issues that it has presented to bankruptcy courts
since 2005). The "current monthly income" position taken by the United States
Trustee is that unemployment compensation is included in the calculation. Id.
at 28 (emphasis added).
25. In re Kimbro, 389 B.R. 518, 527 (6th Cir. BAP 2008) (labeling the
means test as a "bright-line" test that eliminates judicial discretion). See also
THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, supra note 10, at 151 (referring to the
means test, Congress gave a clear instruction to the courts to presume abuse
exists according to the means test formula of income less expenses if the
amount is more than the test allows). "The starting point is unambiguous: No
more judicial weighing and measuring what constitutes abuse under the
highly individualized circumstances of each person who files for bankruptcy
relief. Instead ... the judges have their marching orders from Congress: Apply
the formula to all Chapter 7 filers, then dismiss or convert the cases that the
formula identifies as abusive." Id.
26. See Kimbro, 389 B.R. at 528 (stating "[t]he clear policies behind the
means test were the uniform application of a bright-line test that eliminates
judicial discretion. Plainly, Congress determined that these policies were more
important than accuracy"); A. Jay Cristol and Cheryl Kaplan, 11 U.S.C. §
707(b)(2)(A)(III): Does it Mean What it Says and Say What it Means?, 19 U.
FLA. J.L. PUB. POLY 1, 2 (2008) (discussing Chief Judge Emeritus of the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida Jay Cristol's view of
BAPCPA's means test, referring to it as, "Congress's ill-conceived attempt to
curb abuse in bankruptcy.. ."); Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New §
707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 281 (2005) (stating that the means test is
likely to generate a lot of litigation and a lot of confusion; also referring to the
test as "complicated and arbitrary"); THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS,
supra note 10, at 142-52 (discussing the means test and the problems in its
application). "The test for eligibility in Chapter 7 is complex. In the 2005
legislation, it filled two printed, single-spaced pages. Like a big meal that can't
be digested all at once, the new formula is best understood when broken into
smaller parts." Id. at 150. See also Marianne B. Culhane and Michaela M.
White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 668 (Winter 2005) (stating, "The means test is far
from perfect. It adds complexity and costs to all cases, and may deter or
dismiss relatively few would-be chapter 7 debtors.").
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to obtain relief in Chapter 7 through its desired, typically quick
discharge. 27 If a debtor fails the means test, he or she is not
allowed to enter Chapter 7, and instead, the debtor must propose a
repayment plan to his or her creditors and go the route of Chapter
13.28

The means test incorporates "current monthly income" of
Section 101(10A) into its formula; based on the initial calculations,
one may find themselves with entry into Chapter 7 or with more
calculations to do.29 If the debtor "passes" the means test, the
debtor is not necessarily off the hook and into the open arms of
Chapter 7.30 The debtor may still be bound by a finding of
"abuse"-a lesser standard than "substantial abuse" of the preBAPCPA Bankruptcy Code-which will allow the bankruptcy
judge to use his or her discretion in converting the Chapter 7 into
a Chapter 13 or Chapter 11 or even dismissing the case outright. 31
Although these other steps are beyond the scope of this Comment,
some highly recognized bankruptcy scholars have recognized the

27. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006). See also Culhane & White, supra note 26, at
665 (beginning the article by stating "[t]he much heralded means test now
guards the gates of chapter 7").
28. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006) (describing at great length the
means test and its requirements). In the pre-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Code,
section 707(b) used to be the section that called for the bankruptcy judge to
dismiss or convert a Chapter 7 filing for "substantial abuse" in three
sentences, but now, the revised version of Section 707(b) created by BAPCPA
covers five single-spaced pages with seven subsections. Culhane& White,
supra note 26, at 668.
29. Section 707(b)(2)(A)(i) states:
In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief would
be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall presume
abuse exists if the debtor's current monthly income reduced by the
amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv), and multiplied by
60 is not less than the lesser of-(I) 25 percent of the debtor's
nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or $7,025, whichever is
greater; or (II) $11,725.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
30. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (2006) (noting that even if the
debtor passes the means test laid out in Section 707(b)(2), the court could
nonetheless declare that the debtor's Chapter 7 filing is an "abuse"). This
section relies on "bad faith" and "totality of the circumstances" analysis that
can lead to dismissal or conversion by the court. Id.
31. Section 707(b)(3) states:
In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief would
be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter in a case in which the
presumption in paragraph (2)(A)(i) does not arise or is rebutted, the
court shall consider-(A) whether the debtor filed the petition in bad
faith; or (B) the totality of the circumstances (including whether the
debtor seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial need
for such rejection as sought by the debtor) of the debtor's financial
situation demonstrates abuse.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (2006).
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"abuse" sections as "catch-all categories with no clear guidelines." 32
C. Debtor Asks, "Is Unemployment Compensation a 'Benefit
Received Under the Social Security Act?"'- Means Test
Form Responds, 'You Tell Me"
The official means test form, 22A, is of no help to a debtor
trying to determine whether his or her unemployment
compensation should be included in the "current monthly income"
calculation: "if you contend that unemployment compensation
received by you or your spouse was a benefit under the Social
Security Act, do not list the amount of such compensation in
Column A or B, but instead state the amount in the space below." 33
Without guidance, the debtor is left to determine if his or her
income is a "benefit received under the Social Security Act".
Few courts have decided the issue of whether debtors must
include their unemployment compensation in their "current
monthly income" calculation, and the courts that have disagree
about whether it should be included or excluded.34 Additionally,
bankruptcy judges have written articles that discuss the means
test and their different perspectives on the "current monthly
income" debate. 35 As of the date of this writing, no district court or
higher court has taken the invitation to resolve this ambiguity and
disagreement.
D. The Social Security Act as It Pertainsto Unemployment
Compensation
The Social Security Act (the "Act") as it pertains to
unemployment compensation has a stabilizing effect on industry
because it aims to provide prompt, partial replacement wages to
individuals who have lost their job to allow workers to "tide

32. THE LAw OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, supra note 10, at 151 (noting

that Congress left some discretion to the bankruptcy judges to find that there
were "special circumstances" like a serious medical condition or service in the
military that may justify calculation adjustments).
33. Statement of Current Monthly Income, (Official Form 22A) (January
2008).
34. See sources cited supra note 5 (showing that different courts come to
different conclusions regarding whether or not unemployment compensation
should be included in a debtor's "current monthly income" calculation).
35. See, e.g., Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 231, 247 (2005) (opining that excluding unemployment
compensation from the "current monthly income" calculations of the debtors
"would be a strained interpretation ... since unemployed individuals received
no benefits 'under the Social Security Act' but only under the programs
adopted by the states, which may provide benefits beyond those that are
federally funded."). Judge Wedoff's opinion is in accord with the holdings of
the courts in the cases of In re Baden and In re Kucharz. See generally
Kucharz, 418 B.R. at 643; Baden, 396 B.R. at 623.
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themselves over." 36 The Act is a federal law that provides the
states funding to distribute unemployment compensation to their
citizens in a way the state determines, but subject to federal
approval.37 In this way, the Code and the Act collide. The following
illustrates the collision between the Bankruptcy Code and the
Social Security Act: "unemployment compensation will present a
difficult problem since it is partially funded by the federal
government under the Social Security Act, and social security
benefits are not included in 'current monthly income."'38
The next section of this Comment will examine the cases and
commentators that have taken positions on the "current monthly
income" debate. Part IV will propose a resolution to the conflict.
III. ANALYSIS
This section will examine how courts and commentators view
the issue of whether unemployment compensation should be
considered in the "current monthly income" calculation. The first
section will review the approach of courts that faced this issue
before the changes that came with BAPCPA. Section B will
examine the statutory connection between unemployment
compensation and the Social Security Act. Next, section C will
discuss the cases and commentators who have decided that
unemployment compensation is included in a debtor's "current
monthly income." Finally, section D will address the courts holding
that unemployment compensation is excluded from a debtor's
"current monthly income."

36. See generally California Dept. of Human Res. Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S.
121, 132 (1971) (quoting H.R. Rep. No.615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1935))
(examining the beginning of the Social Security Act as established by
executive order of President Roosevelt in 1935).
37. See, e.g., Java, 402 U.S. at 135 (overturning California's applicable
unemployment compensation statute due to it being inconsistent with the
Social Security Act); St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 775 n.3 (1981) (stating that all states have
unemployment compensation as provided by the Social Security Act, but these
states can, if they so choose, expand the amount of protection provided to their
citizens and in that way go beyond what is required of them by the Social
Security Act).
38. Ronald R. Peterson, A Means Test by No Means 11 U.S.C. § 707 and
BAPCPA, AM. CONFERENCE INST., p. 6 (Jan. 23, 2006). See also Allard et al.,
supra note 18 (reiterating the point that unemployment compensation is a
gray area as a "benefit received under the Social Security Act," and laying out
the arguments for and against including unemployment compensation in the
"current monthly income" calculation of debtors.
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Unemployment Compensation as "Income"before BAPCPA

Congress created a new phrase, "current monthly income," in
the BAPCPA reform and defined it in Section 101(10A).39 Prior to
the adoption of BAPCPA, unemployment compensation and other
forms of state aid were included in the calculation of disposable
income of the debtor. 40 The courts pre-BAPCPA would allow for
things like unemployment compensation to be used to fund a
Chapter 13 plan. 41
Recently, Judge Leif M. Clark of the Western District of
Texas noted this fact but pointed out, "[o]f course, those preBAPCPA decisions did not have to struggle with a definition of
'disposable income' that incorporated a new defined term, 'current
monthly income,' as is now the case under BAPCPA." 42
39. See Culhane & White, supra note 26, at 674 (noting the new definition
of "current monthly income" and how it is calculated.
40. See, e.g., In re Hickman, 104 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr. Dist. Colo. 1989)
(holding that "public assistance income" does allow a debtor to qualify for
Chapter 13); In re Compton, 88 B.R. 166, 167 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding
that even though the Chapter 13 debtor was about to lose her unemployment
compensation and possibly get a higher paying job, the unemployment
compensation noted in the Chapter 13 plan would be used to create the budget
of the debtor); In re Overstreet, 23 B.R. 712, 713-14 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1982)
(holding that a debtor in Chapter 13 can use unemployment compensation to
make his or her Chapter 13 plan feasible even though the length of the
compensation would not last the entire time of the debtor's plan). The thrust of
these cases, therefore, is that if an individual debtor decides that he or she
would like to repay debts with public aid, or any other type of income that is
sufficiently stable and regular, then the courts would not deny this debtor his
or her right to do so.
41. See, e.g., In re Overstreet, 23 B.R. at 714 (allowing a debtor to use
unemployment compensation to make the Chapter 13 plan feasible). See also
supra note 40 (describing noteworthy Chapter 13 cases where the court
allowed the debtor to do what he or she initially wanted to do, which is
propose a Chapter 13 repayment plan to be paid with their public assistance
cash). The cases did not limit an individual's access to a Chapter of the
Bankruptcy Code that they deemed necessary, but rather the courts allowed
the debtors to propose to repay their debts with these funds as they saw fit. Id.
If the outcome were the same after BAPCPA, it could be argued that the court
allowed the debtors in these cases to take the carrot provided by Congress in
Chapter 13 repayment plans as opposed to prodding these debtors into a
Chapter 13 with the stick of calculating "current monthly income" and the
means test.
42. In re Barfknecht, 378 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007) (holding
Social Security benefits received under the Social Security Act are excluded
from the calculation of "current monthly income" and thus by reference from
"projected disposable income," as described by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2), which
incorporates the definition of "current monthly income" into its formula).
Section 1325(b)(2) states:
For purposes of this subsection, the term 'disposable income' means
current monthly income received by the debtor (other than child support
payments, foster care payments, or disability payments for a dependent
child made in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law to the
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In short, BAPCPA has changed the rules and what is past, at
least in the context of determining a debtor's income, is past. A
new path of determining "current monthly income" must be
blazed.
B. Statutory Steps: The Connection Between Unemployment
Compensation and the Social Security Act
The link between unemployment compensation and the Social
Security Act is found in 42 U.S.C. § 501.43 The statute expressly
provides that the federal government will provide funds to the
states "for the purpose of assisting the States in the
administration of their unemployment compensation . . . ." 4 A

state may elect to have unemployment compensation benefits, but
if the state does so it must comply with federal law.45 As noted by
the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio in the case
of In re Sorrell, "[t]hese mandates are inextricably entwined with
the Social Security Act" because if the states are not in compliance
with these requirements it will not receive federal funding. 46
Thus, the Social Security Act created unemployment
compensation by giving tax incentives to the states. 47 When the
Social Security Act was initially enacted in 1935, states were
reluctant to create any funding for unemployment compensation
due to the states' concern that this program would cause business
to leave for states without this program and higher taxes. 48 The
creation of the Social Security Act then rectified this problem by
providing a national program that called on the states to create
extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child) less amounts
reasonably necessary to be expended ...
11 U.S.C. 1325(b)(2) (2006).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 501 (2006) states:
The amounts made available to section 1101(c)(1)(A) of this title for the
purpose of assisting the States in the administration of their
unemployment compensation laws shall be used as hereinafter provided.
44. Id.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006) (laying out what is required of the states to
meet the eligibility requirements of the Social Security Act).
46. In re Sorrell, 359 B.R. 167, 181 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (noting that pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §§ 503 and 504, the Secretary of Labor must certify each state's
compliance with the Social Security Act and noting that if the state law is in
contravention of the Social Security Act then the state law will be deemed
invalid). See also Pennington v. Didrickson, 22 F.3d 1376, 1378 (7th Cir. 1994)
(discussing 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-04 and noting that unemployment compensation
is administered at the state level and is largely funded by federal funds, but
the Secretary of Labor must certify that the states receiving these funds are
meeting the federal requirements of the Social Security Act).
47. See Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587-88 (1937)
(pointing out that many states were reluctant to create an unemployment
compensation program because the states worried that this would drive away
business due to the increase of taxes that this program would require).

48. Id.
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this program subject to the federal approval of the states' system. 49
The Supreme Court described the genesis of the
unemployment provisions of the Social Security Act as a "response
to the widespread unemployment that accompanied the Great
Depression. [The Social Security Act] called for a cooperative
federal-state program of benefits to unemployed workers."50
Notably, an alternative proposal to run the unemployment
compensation system as a national system failed.5 1 With the
cooperative setting in place, the states were free to create their
own laws governing how the unemployment benefits would be
administered, but those states were subject to federal review to
ensure compliance with the Social Security Act. 52
Interestingly, the Social Security Act was originally known as
"A Bill to Alleviate the Hazards of Old Age, Unemployment,
Illness and Dependency." 53 Edwin E. White, the Executive Director
of the Committee on Economic Security who was involved in the
drafting of the Social Security Act, notes, "[u]nemployment
compensation was regarded by the Committee on Economic
Security and its staff as the most important part of the entire
legislation."54 This was likely the case due to the fact that the
49. Id.
50. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S.
772, 775 (1981).
51. See EDWIN E. WHITE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
112-14 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1963) (discussing the debates that occurred during
the enactment of the Social Security Act where one proposal was to create a
federally run unemployment compensation program but noting that President
Roosevelt's initial instructions were to create a system of unemployment
compensation that had a cooperative approach between the states and the
federal government).
52. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 478 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1986)
(noting that when Congress enacted the Social Security Act, this "motivat[ed]
the enactment of state programs throughout the Nation"). The Court
continued by reviewing Steward Machine Company, where the Court stated
that unemployment compensation was basically a "project" of the states before
Congress created the Social Security Act. Id. at 633 n.25. After the creation of
this Act, the states were then free to create their own scheme of
unemployment compensation programs, though they were required to provide
a federal minimum of unemployment compensation as provided by the Act. Id.
at 633.
53. See Social Security Online, Reports and Studies: Senate Hearings on
1935 Bill, http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/35senate.html (last visited, Apr.
11, 2011) (noting the history of the Social Security Act and the title of the
original bill). This site allows for access to the 74th Congress Debates about
the bill in 1935 shortly after President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent it to
Congress for approval. Id.
54. EDWIN E. WHITE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
111 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1963). See also W. ANDREW ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL
SECURITY: VISIONS AND REVISIONS 19-20 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1986)
(discussing the beginnings of the Social Security Act). The Committee on
Economic Security conducted debates among experts during the time of the
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nation was in the midst of the Great Depression.
Perhaps the "hazard" of unemployment in the Great
Depression of the 1930s is rearing its head again in the recession
the United States faces today. Certainly those who have lost their
jobs in the recent recession, which has caused forty-three states to
recently report further job losses,55 would acknowledge the hazard.
C. In re Baden, In re Kucharz, and Judge Wedoff's Approach:
Unemployment Compensation Included in the Debtor's
"CurrentMonthly Income"
1. The In re Baden Approach
The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
recently held that a Chapter 13 debtor's unemployment
compensation received within six months of filing a petition for
bankruptcy relief was not a "benefit received under the Social
Security Act;" thus this income must be included in the debtor's
"current monthly income" calculation.5 6 The court determined that
the definitions in Section 101(10A)(A) and (B) were ambiguous. 5 7
Great Depression. Id. at 19. Unemployment compensation programs
constituted the Committee's top priority, taking into account this time in
history. Id. Specifically, the Director of the Committee, Edwin E. White, was
fixed on designing a system of unemployment compensation. Id. at 20. Mr.
White's efforts in focusing on the unemployment compensation issue instead of
others like old age benefits drew quite a bit of criticism. Id. A letter from Mr.
White to the President stated, "I do not know whether this is the time for any
federal legislation on old age security." Id. Thus, unemployment compensation
was integral to the creation of the Social Security Act. Although the Social
Security Act is now known for the benefits associated with old age and
retirement, at its genesis the Act was contemplated to alleviate the hazards of
unemployment that came with the Great Depression,and the old age benefits
were secondary. Id.
55. See Christopher Rugaber, 23 States Report Higher Unemployment in
September, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 21, 2009, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/
20091021/ap-on-bi_goe c_f/us_state unemployment (pointing out that
companies are still reluctant to hire additional workers due to the state of the
economy). The United States jobless rate hit 9.8% in September 2009, which is
a twenty-six year high. Id.
56. Baden, 396 B.R. at 623.
57. Id. at 621-22 (noting that several courts determined the provisions of
BAPCPA to be ambiguous, so they movied beyond the "plain language" of the
statute to determine the "intent of Congress"). In determining that the
provisions of BAPCPA are ambiguous, the court determined that all of the
BAPCPA amendments are ambiguous allowing them to interpret the "intent of
Congress" in enacting this statute. Id. The court stated, "[s]everal courts have
acknowledged the lack of clarity in the provisions of the BAPCPA." Id. (citing
Sorrell, 359 B.R. at 173); see also In re Paschal, 337 B.R. 274, 277 (Bankr. E.D.
N.C. 2006) (finding ambiguity in BAPCPA generally); In re Collins, 334 B.R.
655, 658 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (stating the same). In the cases cited by the
court in Baden, only In re Sorrell addressed the "ambiguous" section, 11
U.S.C. § 101(1OA)(B), which, in contravention of Baden, held unemployment
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The court highlighted the problems other courts have had in
interpreting the ambiguous language of BAPCPA, and looked
beyond the plain language of BAPCPA to "determine the intent of
Congress."58 In order to accomplish this goal, the court reviewed
the legislative history of BAPCPA and found little assistance.5 9
The court, however, determined that the "two primary
concerns" of Congress in enacting BAPCPA were: "(1) Protecting
the Bankruptcy System from being abused by ensuring that those
who could afford to pay their debts did pay; and (2) protecting
education and retirement savings from being drained by
creditors."60 The court concluded that these goals are
"incongruous" with both of the goals that they identified from the
Congressional debates.6 ' The court stated that "[a]llowing the
unemployed to retain any excess funds they receive while failing to
pay their bills runs contrary to Congress' [sic] goal of preventing
abuse by those who can afford to pay a portion of their bills" and
the goal of protecting retirement savings. 62
Another determinative factor for the court in Baden was that
the pre-BAPCPA approach, as discussed above, included income
from all sources. 63The court found that since Congress knew that
unemployment compensation was previously incorporated in the
debtor's "income" before their BAPCPA amendments, Congress
would have specifically called for unemployment compensation to
be excluded from debtors' "current monthly income" if Congress
intended that result. 64
2. The In re Kucharz Approach

On October 28, 2009, the Chief Judge of the Bankruptcy
Court for the Central District of Illinois entered the debate on
whether unemployment compensation is a "benefit received under
the Social Security Act," and determined that unemployment
compensation should be included in the debtor's "current monthly

compensation to be excluded from the "current monthly income" calculations
of debtors.
58. Id. at 621-22.
59. Id. at 622.
60. Id. (citing generally to Senate and House discussions of BAPCPA
during the 105th Congress). The court stated that after a "thorough analysis"
of the discussions of Congress on BAPCPA, it found that there were two
"primary concerns" Congress had in enacting BAPCPA: (1) to protect
retirement saving plans; and (2) to ensure that individuals who can pay their
debts do pay their debts. Id. The court concluded that those goals would not be
furthered by allowing unemployment compensation to be excluded from the
"current monthly income" calculation of debtors. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 623.
64. Id.
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income" calculation.65 The court began the analysis by noting that
this issue presents a "surprisingly difficult question."66 The court
then discussed whether the Act creates a federal program of
unemployment compensation or one that is mainly state run.67
The court noted that the Social Security Act created incentives for
the states to enact unemployment programs, but importantly, the
court found that the benefits paid to the unemployed citizens of
the state are received under state law as opposed to the Social
Security Act.68
The court reached this conclusion by focusing on the word
"under" in the phrase, "benefit received under the Social Security
Act" of Section 101(10A)(B).69 It started, "[tihe preposition 'under'
is both the cause of and the key to unlock the mystery."70 The
court found the plain meaning of the word "under," in the
dictionary, to be "required by" or "in accordance with."7 1 The court
reasoned that because the Social Security Act did not compel the
states to enact unemployment compensation programs, the
unemployment benefits that the citizens of these states receive are
from the states themselves, not the federal government as
provided by the Social Security Act. 72 Thus, the court concluded
that the benefits are not received "under" the Social Security Act
but rather "under" the states' unemployment programs. 73
After determining the meaning of the language of Section
101(10A)(B), the court proceeded to examine the "contextual
analysis" of the Section 101(10A)(B).74 The court found that
BAPCPA and the means test were put in place to identify those
debtors who have the ability to pay their creditors so that they do
pay their creditors.75 The court noted that "current monthly
income" is a backward-looking test that then is projected forward
to determine the debtor's income in the future.76 The court found
that to leave unemployment compensation out of this calculation
would render an inaccurate determination of what the debtor will
earn in the future because it would omit the unemployment

65. Kucharz, 418 B.R. at 643.
66. Id. at 637.
67. Id. at 637-38.
68. Id. at 639. The court noted that if the Social Security Act was repealed
the Illinois, the unemployment compensation program would still be able to
continue Id.
69. Id. at 641.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 641.
75. Id. at 641-42.
76. Id. at 642.
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compensation received in the place of wages.7 7
3. Judge Eugene R. Wedoff's Approach

Although there is no published opinion as of the writing of
this Comment regarding whether unemployment compensation
should be considered in the "current monthly income" calculation
of debtors in the Northern District of Illinois, Judge Wedoff, a
bankruptcy judge in this jurisdiction, has discussed his thoughts
on the issue in an article he authored soon after BAPCPA took
effect.78 Judge Wedoff acknowledged that the argument could be
made that unemployment compensation was a "benefit received
under the Social Security Act" but opined, "[t]his would be a
strained interpretation, however, since unemployed individuals
receive no benefits 'under the Social Security Act,' but only under
the programs adopted by their states, which may provide benefits
beyond those that are federally funded."79
The United States Trustee's Office also finds unemployment
compensation to be a "benefit received under the Social Security
Act."80 The United States Trustee's website draws the line in the
sand to advise all debtors that they will challenge any attempt to
claim unemployment compensation as a "benefit received under
the Social Security Act," but as pointed out above, this position is
contrasted by the means test form that invites that debtor
argument.8 1

77. Id.
78. Wedoff, supra note 35, at 281.
79. Id. at 247.
80. See Allard et al., supra note 18 (stating that the position of the United
States Trustee is that unemployment compensation is included in "current
monthly income" calculations of debtors, and that the United States Trustee
will challenge any attempt to exclude this compensation); see also STATEMENT
OF THE U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM'S POSITION ON THE LEGAL ISSUES ARISING
UNDER THE CHAPTER 13 DISPOSABLE INCOME TEST 2 (2009),
(stating
http://www.justice.gov/ustleolbapcpaldocs/chapterl3analysis.pdf
"Line 8, Unemployment compensation. Unemployment compensation is not a
'benefit under [the Social Security Act]' and should be included; [the United
States Trustee] opposes any entry in the boxes to the left of Columns A and
B"). The United States Trustee website clearly states that unemployment
compensation should be included in the debtor's "current monthly income" on
the means test form. Id. But, the means test form still allows for this
argument to be made. Statement of Current Monthly Income, (Official Form
22A) (Jan. 2008) (inviting debtors to determine on their own whether they find
unemployment compensation to be a "benefit received under the Social
Security Act").
81. See Allard et al., supra note 18 (pointing out the conflict between the
United States Trustee's view of unemployment compensation and that of the
means test form inviting the debtor to determine whether this income is part
of the debtor's "current monthly income").
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D. In re Sorrell and In re Munger Approach: Unemployment
Compensation Excluded in the Debtor's "CurrentMonthly Income"
1. The In re Sorrell Approach
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio in the
case of In re Sorrell crafted a different approach to the
unemployment compensation analysis to conclude that this
compensation is a "benefit under the Social Security Act."8 2 This
court was the first to address this issue and publish an opinion
after the enactment of the BAPCPA reforms.8 3 The court began its
analysis of this issue with a comment on the ambiguity presented
by the BAPCPA reforms. 84 The court determined that despite the
ambiguity that the BAPCPA reform created, it would apply the
ordinary meaning of the language Congress used.85
Upon review of the language of Section 101(10A), the court
found that certainly unemployment compensation is a "benefit,"
but noted that a determination must be made whether this is a
"benefit under the Social Security Act."86 In order to accomplish
this goal, the court looked at the law of unemployment
compensation as applied through state and federal law.87 The
federal law that applies is the Social Security Act, which funds the
states' unemployment programs and regulates them.88 The court
then refused the United States Trustee's invitation to view the
payments the debtors received in unemployment compensation to
be an indirect benefit from the Social Security Act as opposed to a
direct benefit.89 The court found that Section 101(10A)(B) does not
mention "payments" but only "benefits," which the court found to
be a much broader word.90
82. See generally Sorrell, 359 B.R. at 183.
83. Id. at 180 (stating, "[t]he court is not aware of any reported decisions
on the question, [of whether unemployment compensation is a "benefit
received under the Social Security Act"], although the issue has been
addressed by bankruptcy commentators"). This court, therefore, broke new
ground in interpreting this section of the BAPCPA amendments.
84. Id. at 172-73 (quoting another court that found Section 362(c)(3) as
"neither consistent nor coherent." The court continued by referencing another
commentator and judge, Thomas Small, who stated that "in an Act in which
head-scratching opportunities abound for both attorneys and judges alike §
362(c)(3)(A) stands out"). The court stated that the reason for noting these
issues with BAPCPA was not to criticize the provisions but to make note that
the amendments are not all together straightforward or clear. Id. at 173. "The
attempt (necessity) of bankruptcy courts to determine (create) the results
intended in the 2005 Act is complicated in such instances." Id.
85. Id. at 176.
86. Id. at 181.

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Next the court noted that there are other references to the Act
in the Code that specifically state selected sections of the Act that
apply. 9' The court concludes that if Congress intended
unemployment compensation to be left out of Section 101(10A)(B)
it knew how to do so as shown in these other sections. 92 Therefore,
the court held that unemployment compensation is excluded from
the debtors' "current monthly income."93
2.

The In re Munger Approach

A bankruptcy court in Massachusetts also weighed in on this
debate and sided with the Sorrell court, finding that
unemployment compensation is a "benefit received under the
Social Security Act" as provided by Section 101(10A)(B).94 This
court relied much on the analysis of the Sorrell decision, but it
added an analysis of the commentators who have addressed this
issue.95
In sum, each court that has addressed this issue has found
ambiguity in BAPCPA generally and in Section 101(10A)(B)
particularly. The courts agree that the plain meaning of the
91. Id. The court here took the statutory steps as laid out in Section II.B. of
this Comment by first discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1321, which describes the
eligibility requirements of the states in receiving federal funds under the
Social Security Act. Id. at 181. The court then noted that the Social Security
Act requires that the Secretary of Labor certify each states' compliance with
42 U.S.C. § 504, which allows for judicial review of the Secretary of Labor's
decision not to allow the states payment based on the states' noncompliance
with the Social Security Act. Id. The court continued with cites to Section 503
of the Social Security Act that states the Secretary of Labor will not certify
payments to states for their unemployment compensation funds unless those
states' laws are in compliance with the Social Security Act as laid out in 42
U.S.C. § 503. Id. Finally, the court concluded that if any state laws were in
conflict with the Social Security Act, they would be trumped by the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 183.
94. See generally Munger, 370 B.R. at 26.
95. Id. at 23-25. The court based its determination that unemployment
compensation should be excluded from "current monthly income" calculations
as a "benefit received under the Social Security Act" based on its statutory
interpretation and the Sorrell opinion. Id. The court found that Section
101(10A)(B) clearly states that Social Security Act benefits should be excluded
from "current monthly income," and the court refused to look further at the
intent of Congress. Id. The In re Baden court reviewed both the In re Sorrell
and In re Munger analysis and determined that they were both flawed. See
Baden, 396 B.R. at 619 (determining that both of the cases were wrongly
decided because Congress knew that unemployment compensation was
previously included in the income calculations of debtors). Thus, Congress
could have expressly excluded that income if it had so chose, and the goals of
Congress in enacting BAPCPA would not be furthered by allowing a debtor to
exclude unemployment compensation in their "current monthly income"
calculation. Id.
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statute should apply; however, they differ on whether it is possible
to apply such a meaning. While both positions have support, the
exclusion of unemployment benefits in a debtor's "current monthly
income" calculation is the position with the most legal and logical
support.
IV. PROPOSAL

Exclusion of the debtor's unemployment compensation as a
"benefit received under the Social Security Act" has the most
support and is a logical result. This conclusion is supported by the
plain language of Section 101(10A)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
purpose and effect of the Social Security Act, the problems that
arise in delving into the "intent" of Congress in enacting
legislation, and the special difficulty presented by attempting to
find the "intent" of Congress in enacting BAPCPA.
This is an active controversy ripe for review by the district
(and possibly, appellate) courts. Bankruptcy Judge Stephen S.
Mitchell from the Eastern District of Virginia recently sidestepped
this "thorny" issue because the "current monthly income" of the
debtor in the particular case, inclusive of the debtor's
96
unemployment compensation, would not violate the means test.

A. The PlainMeaning of Section 101(10A)(B) Compels Exclusion
of Unemployment Compensation in the "CurrentMonthly Income"
Calculationof Debtors
A "plain meaning" approach is always subjective, depending
mostly on the individual reading the statute.97 However, it must
96. In re Avellaneda, No. 09-18106-SSM, 2009 WL 5066667 *1 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2009).
97. CompareIn re Ransom, 577 F.3d 1026, 1030-32 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding
that pursuant to the "statutory language, plainly read" Section
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) does not allow an above average income earner who has been
forced into Chapter 13 by the means test to deduct from his Chapter 13 plan
"ownership costs" that the debtor does not actually incur on his vehicle and
concluded that an "ownership cost" is not an expense as it pertains to this
section), with Kimbro, 389 B.R. at 527 (holding that the "plain meaning" of
Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) allows the debtor who was forced by the means test
into Chapter 13 to continue to deduct his expense of owning a vehicle even
though the debtor owned the vehicle outright and had no set expense for the
vehicle), In re Tate, 571 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the "plain
meaning" approach in interpreting the means test Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(1) as
it pertains to vehicle ownership deduction of a vehicle that is owned outright is
an expense that can be deducted from a Chapter 13 debtor's plan), and In re
Ross-Tousey, 549 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (7th Cir. 2008) (adopting what is now
referred to as the "plain meaning approach" and holding that a vehicle not
encumbered by a debt or lease nevertheless qualified for a deduction in a
Chapter 13 debtor's plan pursuant to Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) and the plain
reading of the statute). So much has this issue divided the circuits that in the
final conclusory paragraph of the case of In re Ransom, the Ninth Circuit
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be assumed that Congress said what it meant to say, or a venture
into the quagmire of finding the "intent" of Congress would be
required even in addressing the most straightforward statute. On
the principles of statutory construction, the United States
Supreme Court stated "[a]s we have repeatedly held, the
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative
history or any other extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a
role in statutory interpretation only to the extent that they shed
light on the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise
ambiguous terms."9 8 Section 101(1OA)(B) states that "current
monthly income", "excludes benefits received under the Social
Security Act, payments to victims of war crimes or. .. victims of . .
. terrorism." As pointed out in the case of In re Sorrell,
unemployment compensation is quite clearly a "benefit."99 And, as
discussed above, and further discussed in the next section,
unemployment compensation is available due to the fact that the
Social Security Act allowed it.100
Additionally, Congress used the word "benefit" in describing
compensation that should be excluded in a debtor's "current
monthly income" calculation under the Social Security Act, as
referenced in Sorrell.0 1 In that same section Congress used the
word "payments" to describe the compensation received by the
potential debtor due to crimes against humanity or due to
terrorism. 102 The use of the word "benefits" in Section 101(10A)(B)
when referring to the Social Security Act is notably broader than
the word "payments" in referring to the victims of terrorism. 0 3
made an impassioned plea to Congress to provide some sort of guidance on the
issue. Ransom, 577 F.3d at 1031-32. The court found that the "correct" answer
to the question of whether a debtor in a Chapter 13 repayment plan may
deduct an expense for a vehicle that the debtor owes outright has caused
courts to struggle for years. Id. The court complained that this "correct"
answer is "ultimately not upon our interpretation of the statute, but upon
what Congress wants the answer to be. We would hope, in this regard, that we
the judiciary would be relieved of this Sisyphean adventure by legislation
clearly answering [this] straightforward policy question .

. . ."

Id. at 1032. The

Ninth Circuit then took an "unusual step" and sent a copy of its opinion to the
Senate and House Judiciary Committees for a response. Id. The Ninth Circuit
now, with bated breath, awaits an answer to this divisive issue.
98. Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568-69
(2005) (emphasis added).
99. Sorrell, 359 B.R. at 181 (stating, "[t]here is no dispute that
unemployment compensation constitutes a benefit, the analysis focuses on
whether this is one of the 'benefits received under the Social Security Act."')
100. See supra Section III.B. (discussing the statutory connections between
unemployment compensation and the Social Security Act).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(B) (2006).
102. Id.
103. Sorrell, 359 B.R. at 181 (noting that "[t]he applicable text [of Section
101(10A)(B)] does not speak of 'payments', direct, indirect, or otherwise, but
instead contains the unambiguously broader term of'benefits."').
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Thus, this broad term used by Congress in Section 101(10A)(B)
should be read to include all benefits that the Social Security Act
provides without a foray into a direct or indirect analysis uncalled
for pursuant to that section.
B. The Indirect/DirectAnalysis Courts Have Used to Determine
That Unemployment Compensation Is Included in a Debtor's
"CurrentMonthly Income" CalculationIs Unnecessary and Flawed
The logic of the case of In re Kucharz is easily assailable. In

that case, the court held that the states are the entities that
provide unemployment compensation because the Social Security
Act did not mandate that the states create the unemployment
compensation programs. That court acknowledged that the states
were wary of enacting unemployment programs before the Social
Security Act. 104 After the federal government promulgated the
Social Security Act in 1935, which created incentives for the states
to create an unemployment compensation program, the states
were then free to do so, and by 1937, forty-two states had enacted
this legislation. 10 5 The unemployment benefits received are clearly
a "benefit received under the Social Security Act" as required by
Section 101(10A)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code because if the Social
Security Act was not passed with its incentives to the states, the
states would not have enacted their own unemployment
compensation programs.
The argument that unemployment compensation is not
directly "under" the Social Security Act, and therefore not a
"benefit" under the Act, fails to recognize the fact that the Social
Security Act was the reason why the states were able to create
106
unemployment compensation programs in the first place.
President Roosevelt's message to the drafters of the Social
Security Act underlines the fact that the states were asked by the
federal government to create unemployment compensation
programs.107 The President stated, "[t]he purpose of [the federal
104. See Kucharz, 418 B.R. at 641 n.5 (noting that before the Social Security

Act the states were wary of enacting unemployment compensation programs

due to the increase in taxes that would result and the possibility that such a
program would drive businesses from the state to other states without such a

program).
105. Id. (citing Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 575, 577-78
(1937)).
106. See Kucharz, 418 B.R. at 641 n.5 (discussing that states were free to
enact unemployment compensation due to the creation of the Social Security
Act).
107. See EDWIN E. WHITE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
128 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1963) (reproducing the entire January 17, 1935,
statement of the President to Congress regarding the bill that would
eventually become the Social Security Act).
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payroll tax to support unemployment compensation] is to afford a
requirement of a reasonably uniform character for all States
cooperating with the Federal Government and to promote and
encourage the passage of unemployment compensation laws in the
States."10 8 Because the Social Security Act created the incentive
and the means for states to have unemployment compensation
programs, the compensation should be considered as a "benefit
received under the Social Security Act" pursuant to Section
101(10A)(B).
C. Courts That Look to the "Intent"of Congress in Enacting
Legislation, Where There Is No Clear Statement Provided of Such
Intent, Are Drafting Their Own Legislation
The courts in the cases of In re Baden and In re Kucharz
found that even though Section 101(10A)(B) says what it says, it
was still necessary to look to the "intent of Congress."10 9 First, it is
clear that there is likely no one intent of Congress in enacting any
one piece of legislation.110 The draw to this type of mental exercise
is, as one commentator pointed out, looking through the legislative
history of a certain bill and picking out one's friends."'
The likely root of the problem that courts and commentators
have faced with Section 101(10A)(B) is what George Orwell

108. Id.
109. Kucharz, 418 B.R. at 641 (stating, "[b]ecause the language of the
provision is ambiguous, it is appropriate to also consider a contextual
analysis."). The Court further stated, "[a] statutory provision's context consists
not only of other sentences and related provisions, but also of the real-world
situation to which the language pertains." Id. (citations omitted); Baden, 396
B.R. at 622 (noting, "[s]ince the language of this provision [Section
101(10A)(B)] is unclear, it is necessary to look beyond the plain language to
correctly interpret the statute.").
110. See, e.g., In re McNabb, 326 B.R. 785, 789 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005)
(stating that legislative history is "virtually useless as an aid in understanding
the language and intent of BAPCPA"); ALLEN KAMP, THE CRIT,
JURISPRUDENCE: BEGINNER'S SIMPLE AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ADVANCED
AND
COMPLEX
LEGAL
THEORY
93-94
(2009),
http://w
ww.thecritui.com/articles/Kamp4.pdf (discussing both Justice Scalia's disdain
for the use of legislative intent to find the meaning of a statute as well as
Seventh Circuit Justice Easterbrook's notion that legislative intent is a
"useless fiction"). Professor Kamp goes on to state that "[flocusing on
legislative policies equates meaning with election returns." Id. See also
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 216 (1983) (discussing the
problems with reviewing legislative history in order to come up with a solution
to ambiguous statues and further states that "[t]he legislative materials at [a
court's] disposal of course do not, and probably never will, accurately and
comprehensively record what actually took place during the convoluted
process of enactment.").
111. See Wald, supra note 110, at 214 (quoting a conversation with a federal
judge colleague, Judge Harold Leventhal).

2011]1

The "CurrentMonthly Income" Debate

825

described in his essay on Politics and the English Language as a
"pretentious, Latinized style." 112 Orwell explained this style
"gum[s] together long strips of words which have already been set
in order by someone else, and mak[es] the result presentable by
sheer humbug. The attraction of this way of writing is that it is
easy ... [i]f you use readymade phrases, you ... don't have to hunt
about for words .

. . ."113

The problem with hunting for the "intent" of Congress, as it
pertains to Section 101(10A)(B), is that there is no one intent of
Congress in enacting this portion of BAPCPA.114 To the credit of
the courts in both In re Baden and In re Kucharz, the plain
meaning of the statute was discussed yet the courts found
ambiguity and then went searching for the "intent" of Congress.11i
Section 101(10A)(B) clearly and expressly excludes "benefits
received under the Social Security Act" from the "current monthly
income" calculation. 116 As discussed above, unemployment
compensation falls into that broad category.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not the province of the courts to determine what
Congress meant to say and read between the lines if the statute is
clear and unambiguous. 117 The reason courts have seen Section
112. GEORGE ORWELL, Politics and the English Language, in COLLECTION
OF ESSAYS, 156, 164 (1946).

113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Sorrell, 359 B.R. at 176 (citations omitted) (noting that there
was no "conference report" for BAPCPA, thus there is no legislative history
that can be used to resolve the ambiguities that are apparent in BAPCPA).
115. See Kucharz, 418 B.R. at 640 (noting that the first step is the "textual
analysis," and the text of the statute suggests that the benefits received by
unemployed individuals are not "under" the Social Security Act, but rather
those benefits are "under" state programs of unemployment compensation);
Baden, 396 B.R. at 621-22 (noting that several courts have found BAPCPA
provisions unclear for the proposition that the court should look beyond the
plain meaning of Section 101(10A)(B); also citing the difference of opinion of
Judge Wedoff in interpreting this section and the opinions of In re Sorrell and
In re Munger).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(B).
117. See United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating "[i]t is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its
drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think, perhaps along with
some Members of Congress, is the preferred result."). The rule of applying
what Congress has written if clear and unambiguous has been addressed
many times by the Supreme Court and has produced many quotable adages.
See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 247 n.4 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting, "[s]tretching language in order to write a more effective
statute than Congress devised is not an exercise we should indulge in.");
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989) (stating,
"[o]ur task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it."); United States v.
Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) (noting, "the fact that Congress might have acted

826

The John Marshall Law Review

[44:801

101(10A)(B) as ambiguous is based on the myth of Congressional
"intent" in BAPCPA. BAPCPA has changed the bankruptcy rules
significantly, and courts should apply it as written. If this is
contrary to Congress's intent, whatever that may have been, the
Code may once again be amended; perhaps it could be called
"BAPCPA Reconsidered."

with greater clarity or foresight does not give courts a carte blanche to redraft
statutes in an effort to achieve that which Congress is perceived to have failed
to do."); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667 (1897) (stating, "nothing is better
settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will
effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or
an absurd conclusion.").

